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ual will thus be obliged to purchase stock only if he ultimately
elects to exercise his option.
FRED A. WATKINS

SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY -

FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT -

INJURICES TO ARMED SERVICES PERSONNEL
Lee v.United States, 261 F. Supp. 252 (C.D. Cal. 1966);
Sheppard v.United States, 369 F.2d 272 (3d Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 87 Sup. Ct. 1286 (1967).
By enacting the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), the federal
government partially waived its sovereign immunity from tort liability. However, immunity was retained in several situations,2 two
of which pertain to claims that arise out of combatant activities of
the armed forces during time of war and to those that originate in
a foreign country.' Nevertheless, the FTCA does not state whether
injuries to servicemen which are not incurred during combatant activities or in a foreign country would give rise to governmental liability. When presented with this specific question in 1950, the
Supreme Court in Feres v. United States4 held that "the Government is not liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries
to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the course
of activity incident to service."'5 The recent cases of Sheppard v.
United States' and Lee v. United States7 emphasize the confusion
and inconsistency which this "incident to service" rule has produced
in the lower federal courts. Furthermore, these recent decisions
create doubt as to whether the Feres doctrine is still valid in light
of subsequent Supreme Court cases. An examination and comparison of the Lee and Sheppard cases will demonstrate these problems.
The facts of Lee and Sheppard arose out of the same occurrence
'Federal Tort Claims Act, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified in scattered sections of
28 U.S.C.) [hereinafter cited as FTCAJ.
2FTCA 5 421, 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1964).
3
FTCA §§ 412 (j), (k), 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (j), (k) (1964).
4 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
51d. at 146. (Emphasis added.)
6 369 F.2d 272 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. deaned, 87 Sup.Ct.1286 (1967).
7 261 F.Supp. 252 (C.D.Cal. 1966) (appeal pending).
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an airplane accident in which the decedents, all United States
Marines on active duty, were in the process of being transferred to
Viet-Nam.' In the course of taking off, the military plane crashed,
-

killing many of its passengers including these servicemen. Thereafter, the personal representatives of the decedents instituted suits

under the FTCA.' The plaintiffs in the Sheppard case alleged that
the crash had been caused by the negligence "'of defendant's agents,
servants, and employees, to wit, members of the United States Air

Force and others."' 10 In Lee, the personal representatives alleged

negligence on the part of the Federal Aviation Agency." Although
the plane crash was definitely "incident to service," the two cases
nonetheless reached different results. The Lee court denied while
the Sheppard court allowed dismissal of the action. The Third Circuit, in affirming the dismissal of the action in Sheppard, denied
the appellants' contention that Feres was no longer valid.' On the
other hand, the district court in the Lee case decided that the incident-to-service rule was "no longer authoritative."'" An analysis of
the rationale of Lee will help explain why the court deemed the
Feres doctrine no longer authoritative.
The district court first traced the development of the incidentto-service rule by discussing the two most important Supreme Court
cases in this area. In Brooks v. United States, 4 two servicemen on
leave or furlough were riding in an automobile on non-military
business. A United States Army truck, which was negligently
driven by a civilian employee of the Army, struck the car and injured one of the servicemen, killing the other. The plaintiffs, the
injured serviceman, and the administrator of the deceased's estate
were allowed to recover under the FTCA. The Court reasoned
that the act did not expressly prohibit all claims of servicemen."
8

See Brief for Appellant on Application for Leave To Take an Interlocutory Appeal, pp. 6, 12, Lee v. United States, 261 F. Supp. 252 (C.D. Cal. 1966), since the district court's opinion for Sheppardis unreported and since the court of appeals' decision
does not present enough facts for a comparison with the Lee case.
9
Sheppard v. United States, 369 F.2d 272 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 87 Sup.
Ct. 1286 (1967); Lee v. United States, 261 F. Supp. 252, 253 (C.D. Cal. 1966).
1OBrief for Appellan% rupra note 8, at 12 (citing plaintiff's brief in Sheppard v.
United States, Civil No. 40541, E.D. Pa., July 27, 1966).
11261 . Supp. at 253.
1'"The flat statement is made on behalf of appellants in their brief that '... subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court destroyed the validity of that case.' Nothing
could be further from the true fact." 369 F.2d at 272.
i 261 F. Supp. at 254.
14 337 U.S. 49 (1949).
15 Id. at 51.
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Therefore, since the accident had nothing to do with the military
careers of the servicemen and since the injuries were not caused by
their military service, the FTCA did not preclude recovery in this
type of situation.1" However, if the accident had been incident to
the Brooks' military service, "a wholly different case would be
presented."17
The "wholly different case" was presented a year later in Feres
v. United States." There, in a consolidation of three cases, 9 the
Court was directly confronted with the question of whether the
FTCA extended its remedy to injuries sustained incident to military
service." Answering in the negative, 2 the Court presented several
principal reasons for its decision. First, the act allowed claims only
where there was an analogous liability on the part of an individual. " Since an individual has no power to raise an army, an anal-

ogous liability did not even remotely exist, and thus the FTCA, by
itself, precluded recovery.3 Second, the presence of a comprehensive system of compensation for service personnel indicated that
this was the exclusive remedy for injuries incurred incident to military service. 4 Third, since the FTCA provides that the law of the
place where the act or omission occurred governs consequent liability,25 it would be irrational to base recovery for servicemen on
36 Id. at 52.
17 Ibid.
18340 U.S. 135 (1950).

19 Feres v. United States, 177 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1949), aff'd, 340 U.S. 135 (1950)
where the appellate court denied an army lieutenant's executrix recovery under the
FTCA for the death of the deceased who, while on active duty, perished in a fire in his
barracks due to the negligence of his superior officers in quartering him there. Jefferson v. United States, 178 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1949), afI'd sub nom.. Fetes v. United
States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950), in which the court of appeals stated that a soldier could
not maintain an action under the FTCA for injuries caused by the negligent failure to
remove a thirty-inch towel from his body after an operation performed by an army
surgeon. Griggs v. United States, 178 F.2d 1 (10th Cit. 1949), fev'd sub noma. Fetes
v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950), where according to the appellate court, a cause
of action under the FTCA was stated by the executrix of the deceased officer's estate
for the active-duty death of the decedent due to the alleged negligence of members of
the Army Medical Corps.
20 340 U.S. at 138.
2
1 See text accompanying note 5 supra.
22 See FTCA § 410 (a), 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1964).
23 340 U.S. at 141-42. The Court even pointed out that there was no analogous
liability upon a state towards its militiamen. Ibid.
24 1d. at 144. For an example of some of the compensation provisions for servicemen, see 10 U.S.C. 55 1201-12 (1964) and for veterans, see 38 U.S.C. 55 314-15, 33435 (1964). For a full discussion of the benefits under the compensation system, see
Note, 49 MARQ. L. REv. 610, 614-15 (1965-1966).
2
5 FrCA § 403 (a), 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (b) (1964).

1967]

FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT

1791

such a provision since the serviceman has no control over the locadons to which his military service might take him 26
According to the district court in the Lee case, the aforementioned rationale of the Feres doctrine has been rejected in later Supreme Court cases." However, the real rationale underlying Feres,
as first enunciated in a subsequent Court case, 2 was
the peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his superiors,
the effects of the maintenance of such suits on discipline, and the
extreme results that might obtain if suits under the Tort Claims
Act were allowed for negligent orders given or negligent acts committed in the course of military duty....29

Relying on this explanation of the Feres case, the Lee court developed its own test for liability under the act. According to the
court the exclusion of military personnel from recourse to the act
"would depend upon whether or not the injuries stemmed from
activities that involved an official military relationship between the
negligent person and the claimant. If so, the claimant would be
precluded; otherwise, he would not.""0 Applying the above, the
district court held that there was no official military relationship
between the Federal Aviation Agency, a non-military body, and the
decedents."1 Consequently, the FTCA did not preclude a remedy
for the plaintiffs.
With the aforementioned rationale of the Lee case in mind, it
might be questioned whether the Lee court was correct in stating
that subsequent Supreme Court cases have rejected the reasoning
underlying the incident-to-service rule, or whether the Sheppard
case is accurate in saying that the Feres doctrine and its rationale
are still viable. An analysis of the reasoning of the Feres case as
26340 U.S. at 142-43. The Court also presented two other reasons for its decision.
One, the FTCA was enacted to alleviate the volume of private bills introduced in Congress regarding compensation for Government-inflicted injuries. However, this influx
of private bills on behalf of the armed forces was not burdensome. Id. at 140. Two,
the relationship between the Government and members of the armed forces was purely
governed by federal law. Federal law, however, did not recognize the type of recovery
which the servicemen sought. Id. at 143-44. For a complete examination of the Feres
rationale, see United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 159-62 (1963).
27
1ee v. United States, 261 F. Supp. 252, 255-56 (C.D. Cal. 1966). The subsequent cases are discussed in the text accompanying notes 32-47 infra.
28
United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 112 (1954). See also United States v.
Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 162 (1963) and Lee v. United States, 261 F. Supp. 252, 256 (C.D.
Cal. 1966), where this rationale is also stated and followed.
29 Ibid. See Hitch, The Federal Tort Claims Act and Military Personnel, 8 RuTGaMs L REV. 316, 341-42 (1954), where the author questions whether suits under the
FTCA would truly affect military discipline.
30

261 F. Supp. at 256.

81id. at 257.
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applied in succeeding Supreme Court decisions will evidence that
neither case is completely correct in its assumption. In light of the
inconsistencies and contradictions by the Court, the most that can
be said is that the persuasiveness of the Feres rationale is questionable.
For example, the Lee case argued that the Feres reasoning, that
the presence of a comprehensive system of compensation prevented
suit under the act, had been specifically rejected in two subsequent
Court decisions. In Brown v. United States 2 a veteran, whose service injury was exacerbated by the negligence of a doctor in a Veterans Administration hospital, was permitted to recover under the
act although he had already received compensation under the Veterans Act."3 Similarly, in United States v. Muniz, 4 the Court stated

that "the presence of a compensation system, persuasive in Feres,
does not of necessity preclude a suit for negligence."3 5 Conversely,
the Court has recently upheld its Feres rationale concerning the exclusiveness of a comprehensive system of compensation. The Supreme Court, in United States v.Demko,8" denied a federal prisoner

recovery under the FTCA since there was a remedy available under
another federal statute." In reaching its decision the Court stated
that "where there is a compensation statute that reasonably and
fairly covers a particular group of workers, it presumably is the
exclusive remedy to protect that group."3 " Consequently, the Court
decisions after Feres are inconsistent as to whether the presence of
a comprehensive system of compensation precludes recovery under
the FTCA.
82348 U.S. 110 (1954).
83 Id. at 113. The Court further stated that the amount received under the Veterans Act should be reduced from the judgment under the FTCA. Ibid.
84 374 U.S. 150 (1963) (federal prisoners could sue under the FTCA for injuries
negligently received during their confinement in prison).
35Id. at 160 (dictum).
86 385 U.S. 149 (1966).
37 See 18 U.S.C. § 4126 (1964), a statute granting compensation for injuries to
federal prisoners suffered in the Federal Prison Industries.
38 385 U.S. at 152. (Emphasis added.) It is interesting to note that although the
statute did not specifically provide for an exclusive remedy, the Demko decision followed the reasoning of Johansen v. United States, 343 U.S. 427 (1952) (civilian employee could not receive compensation under Public Vessels Act because exclusive remedy was under Federal Employees Compensation Act (PECA)) and of Patterson v.
United States, 359 U.S. 495 (1959) (exclusive remedy for civilian employees injured
on merchant vessels was FECA and thus no recovery under suits in Admiralty Act).
The Supreme Court had previously distinguished the Johansen case in United States v.
Brown, 348 U.S. 110 (1954). There, the Court emphasized that Congress had spacifically provided for the exclusiveness of remedy under the FECA, while under the
FTCA there was no such provision. Id. at 113.
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Another inconsistency of the Court, also discussed in Lee, is its
view that it would be irrational for a soldier to base his recovery
under the act upon the law of the place of injury inasmuch as he
has no control over his military assignments. Likewise, a federal
prisoner also has no command over the place where he will be located. Nonetheless, in United States v. Muniz 9 the Court allowed
a federal prisoner who was negligently injured by a Government
employee the right to compensation under the FTCA.40 Therefore,
the Muniz case appears to contradict this "place of injury" rationale.
Moreover, the Feres rationale that the FTCA applied only in a
situation where there was an analogous private liability has been
somewhat modified in a later Supreme Court case.41 Although a
private individual does not operate a lighthouse or conduct a firefighting forest service, the federal government was still held liable
for damages caused by the negligence of its employees performing
such activities.4" In these situations, the Court overturned the Feres
rationale that the analogous liability pertains to a similar private
activity and replaced it with the test of "whether a private person
would be responsible for similar negligence under the laws of the
State where the acts occurred."43 This shift from similar activity
to similar negligence seems to have partially undermined the persuasiveness of the analogous liability rationale.4 4
This rationale has been controverted in still another way. In
Feres, the Court argued that the FTCA provided for governmental
liability in the same manner as a private individual so as "not to
visit the Government with novel and unprecedented liabilities."45
However, this specific reason was completely rejected in Rayonier,
Inc. v. United States.40 There, the Court stated that "the very purpose of the Tort Claims Act was to waive the government's traditional all-encompassing immunity from tort actions and to establish novel and unprecedentedgovernmental liability."4
In addition to the contradictions prevalent in the use of the
89 374 U.S. 150 (1963).
401d. at 161-62.
41Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315 (1957); Indian Towing Co. v.
United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
42 Id. at 69; Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, supra note 41, at 321.
43Id. at 319.
44
See Note, 40 Ky. L.J. 438, 441 (1951-1952) which considers as frivolous the
Court's argument that individuals do not maintain armed forces.
45
F eres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 142 (1950). (Emphasis added.)
401352 U.S. 315 (1957).
47Id. at 319. (Emphasis added.)
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aforementioned Feres rationale, the incident-to-service rule itself
has produced confusion and inconsistency in its application by the
lower federal courts48 as exemplified by the Lee and Sheppard
cases.4" Such inconsistencies can be attributed to several causes.
First, the courts inconsistently stress various phases of the principal
cases in this area - that is, Brooks, Feres, and Brown." Some of
the courts, for example, emphasize the military status of the serviceman at the time of injury." Thus, the judges decide the cases on
several grounds - whether the injury was incurred (1) while the
serviceman was acting in the line of duty,52 (2) while he was on
pass, furlough, or leave, " or (3) while he was engaged in an activity incident to service."4 Other tribunals have accentuated the
exact location of the claimant at the time of injury."n Still others
deny recovery on the ground of the availability to the serviceman
of a comprehensive system of compensation, in lieu of the FTCA.5 6
Finally, as in the Lee case, courts also stress the peculiar and special
relationship of the soldier to his superiors." Accordingly, the variously accentuated phases of Brooks, Fees, and Brown lead the lower
federal courts to confusion and inconsistency.
48

Cf. Knecht v. United States, 144 F. Supp. 786, 789 (E.D. Pa. 1956), afI'd, 242

F.2d 929 (3d Cit. 1957); 19 GA. B.J. 381, 382 (1956-1957); Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d
679, 680 (1959).
49 See text accompanying notes 12-13 supra. See also note 12 supra.
50
See Knecht v. United States, 144 F. Supp. 786, 789 (E.D. Pa. 1956), af'd, 242
F.2d5 929 (3d Cit. 1957).
1 See, e.g., Layne v. United States, 190 F. Supp. 532 (S.D. Ind.), af-'d, 295 F.2d
433 (7th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 990 (1962) (court questioned whether
deceased, a National Guardsman, was member of United States armed forces at the
time of death); Herring v. United States, 98 F. Supp. 69, 70 (D. Colo. 1951) (dictum).
52
Archer v. United States, 217 F.2d 548, 551 (9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348
U.S. 953 (1955); O'Brien v. United States, 192 F.2d 948, 950 (8th Cir. 1951).
5
3 Barnes v. United States, 103 F. Supp. 51, 55 (W.D. Ky. 1952); Brown v. United
States, 99 F. Supp. 685, 687 (S.D.W. Va. 1951). See Zoula v. United States, 217 F.2d
81, 82-83 n.1 (5th Cir. 1954) for an explanation of the difference between a pass and
a furlough or leave.
54
Chambers v. United States, 357 F.2d 224, 229 (8th Cir. 1966) (governmental,
recreational facility); Callaway v. Garber, 289 F.2d 171, 173 (9th Cir.), cart. denied,
368 U.S. 874 (1961) (travel here was incident to service); Richardson v. United States,
226 F. Supp. 49, 50 (E.D. Va. 1964) (recreational facility incident to service).
55
Compare Orken v. United States, 239 F.2d 850 (6th Cit. 1956) (officer killed
in quarters located on military base; no recovery), with Sapp v. United States, 153 F.
Supp. 496 (W.D. La. 1957) (injury to serviceman while sleeping in home situated off
military base; recovery). The reason for a distinction between on-base and off-base
claims is discussed in Gursley v. United States, 232 F. Supp. 614 (D. Colo. 1964).
56 ZouIa v. United States, 217 F.2d 81 (5th Cit. 1954); see Annot., 64 A.LR.2d
679, 685 (1959).
57 United States v. Carroll, 369 F.2d 618, 621 (8th Cit. 1966); Lee v. United States,
261 F. Supp. 252, 256 (C.D. Cal. 1966). For a complete discussion of this relationship, see text accompanying note 29 supra.
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A second reason for this turmoil in the federal courts is the
inappropriate analysis of whether the Brooks, Feres, and Brown
cases complement or supplant one another."6 Thus, the courts have
asserted that (1) the Feres case presents the controlling principle
and the Brooks case should be confined to its precise facts;59 (2)
the Feres and the Brooks decisions are entirely consistent; 0 (3)
Brooks and Brown are exceptions to Feres;6 ' or (4) Feres can be
best explained by the rationale in Brown that pertains to the peculiar and special relationship of a soldier to his superiors.'
Moreover, the incident-to-service rule has been termed a "vague
and meaningless standard,""3 the use of which can, at times, produce
factually inconsistent decisions. For instance, in Brown v. United
States6" and Chambers v. United States" the deceased servicemen
both drowned in a base swimming pool due to the negligence of
employees of the federal government. Although the facts were
similar, different decisions were rendered. The father of the decedent in the Brown case could sue under the FTCA, whereas the
parents of the deceased serviceman in Chambers could not.6 Furthermore, the incident-to-service rule has proved unworkable in dif7 for
ficult and uncontemplated situations. In Callaway v. Garber,"
example, an airman, while under orders and traveling in a private
58 See Knecht v. United States, 144 F. Supp. 786, 789 (E.D. Pa. 1956), ajf'd, 242
F.2d 929 (3d Cir. 1957).
59 Zoula v. United States, 217 F.2d 81, 83 (5th Cir. 1954).
60
Knecht v. United States, 144 F. Supp. 786 (E.D. Pa. 1956), affd, 242 F.2d 929
(3d Cir. 1957).
61
Fass v. United States, 191 F. Supp. 367, 369 (E.D.N.Y. 1961).
6
2 Lee v. United States, 261 F. Supp. 252, 256 (C.D. Cal. 1966).
63 19 GA. B.J. 381, 382 (1956-1957). The author further pointed out that in Cardillo v. Liberty Mut. Co., 330 U.S. 469, 479 (1947), a workmen's compensation case,
the Supreme Court condemned similar language - the injury arose out of and in the
course of employment - "as deceptively simple and litigiously prolific." Ibid.
See also Hitch, supra note 29, at 333-34, where the author calls the incident-to-service rule "judicial legislation." The writer also emphasizes that the Feres doctrine is
incompatible with the Veterans Administration's and the Department of the Army's interpretation of injuries suffered during military service. Id. at 333. Furthermore, the
author points out that the incident-to-service rule can produce absurd results - that
is, a deserter would be able to recover under the FTCA while a loyal serviceman would
nor. Id. at 341.
64 99 F. Supp. 685 (S.D.W. Va. 1951).
65 357 F.2d 224 (8th Cir. 1966).
66Brown v. United States, 99 F. Supp. 685 (S.D.W. Va. 1951). Contra, Chambers v. United States, 357 F.2d 224 (8th Cir. 1966). For a further factual inconsistency, but in relation to property damage, compare United States v. United States Servs.
Auto. Ass'n, 238 F.2d 364 (8th Cir. 1956), with Lund v. United States, 104 F. Supp.
756 (D. Mass. 1952).
67 289 F.2d 171 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,368 U.S. 874 (1961).

1796

WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[VoL 18:1788

automobile in order to attend a special service school, was killed
when the car of a naval recruiting officer, who was also on official
business, struck the auto in which the decedent was a passenger.
The next of kin of the deceased airman was denied recovery under
the act even though the court noted that "the facts here are of an
isolated nature and could be said to be not within the contemplation of the Supreme Court in deciding the Feres case." 8
At the time the Supreme Court decided Feres, the Court failed
to envisage the confusion and inconsistencies that the rationale of
the incident-to-service rule and the rule itself would generate in its
own decisions and in those of the lower federal courts. The turmoil, nonetheless, exists. This confusion underscores the necessity
of a re-evaluation of the Feres doctrine by either the Supreme Court
or Congress. 9 This re-evaluation is further necessitated by the alteration in the Court's membership which has resulted in a shift
from a strict to a liberal construction of .the Federal Tort Claims
Act.7" Only with this re-examination of a serviceman's right to
sue under the act for injuries incurred during military service will
there be an answer to the question posed by the recent conflicting
decisions of Sheppard and Lee, namely, is the Feres doctrine still
authoritative?
HARLAN

M. GoRDoN

68 Id. at 173. The circuit court further stated that it was the Supreme Court's responsibility to settle the problem. Ibid.
6
9See 19 GA. BJ. 381, 382 (1956-1957), where the author suggests that the confusion in this area should be corrected by Congress.
70 Caruso, An Analysis of the Evolution of the Supreme Court's Concept of the
FederalTort Claims Act, 28 FED. B.J. 35, 45 (1966). See also Pound, The Tort Claims
Act: Reason or History?, 30 NACCA LJ.404 (1964).

